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Case Comments
The Scope of the "Business of Insurance" Provision of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act: VirginiaAcademy of
Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Virginia
From 1972 to 1978, Blue Shield of Virginia (the Richmond
Plan) and Blue Shield of Southwestern Virginia (the Roanoke
Plan) reimbursed policyholders for services rendered by
clinical psychologists only if the services were billed through a
physician.' Although the Richmond and Roanoke Plans
claimed that this procedure was necessary to determine
whether a psychologist's treatment was medically justified,2
neither plan required that psychiatrists bill their services
through another physician.3 The Virginia Academy of Clinical
Psychologists-the professional organization of clinical psychologists licensed in Virginia-filed suit against the Richmond
Plan, the Roanoke Plan, and the Neuropsychiatric Society of
1. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624

F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981). The Roanoke
Plan had followed this procedure since its inception in 1945, but the Richmond
Plan had covered direct payments to psychologists for out-patient psychotherapy between 1962 and 1972. Following a sharp increase in claims for nervous
and mental disorders in the late 1960s, the Richmond Plan revised its coverage
after consultations with health care provider groups, including the American
Psychological Association and the Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia (NSV).
The Richmond Plan adopted the billing policy recommended by the NSV. See
Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 469 F. Supp.
552, 556-59 (E.D. Va. 1979).
2. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 469 F.
Supp. 552, 561 (E.D. Va. 1979). The standard Blue Shield subscriber contract
states that only "medically necessary" services are covered. Blue Cross of Va.
v. Commonwealth, 269 S.E.2d 827, 829 (Va. 1980); Group Major Medical Services
Certificate-A, form H.MS-14-MM-A-74 (25) (R 6/74), at 1 (on file with the Minnesota Law Review). Under the terms of such a contract, services are medically
necessary if they are "consistent with the treatment and diagnosis of the patient's condition," follow "standards of good medical practice," are "performed
in the least costly setting required by the patient's medical condition," and are
not rendered "for the convenience of the patient or the physician." 269 S.E.2d
at 829. From Blue Shield's perspective, this billing review policy reduced the
chance of unnecessary treatment and expense. Blue Shield applied the same
"medically necessary" policy to the services of optometrists and opticians, requiring both to bill their services through a physician. See id.
3. Psychiatrists are physicians; psychologists are not. Both, however,
may practice psychotherapy under Virginia law. VA. CODE § 54-273 (1978).
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Virginia (NSV), claiming that the billing practice violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.4 The Academy argued that the practice was either a boycott in violation of the Sherman Act5 and
hence not shielded from antitrust scrutiny by the McCarranFerguson Act,6 or a conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation
of the Sherman Act and not shielded from antitrust scrutiny by
7
the McCarran-Ferguson Act "business of insurance" provision.
The federal district court held that the practice was within the
"business of insurance" provision of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act and that the practice was neither a boycott nor a conspiracy in restraint of trade.8 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed in part,9 holding that the practice of physician
review of a psychologist's bills was not the "business of insurance" within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The Sherman Act makes unlawful "[e]very contract, combination.. ., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states." Id. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
§ 26 (1976). Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va.,
469 F. Supp. 552, 555 (E.D. Va. 1979). In a prior suit, the Richmond and Roanoke
Plans had challenged the constitutionality of a "freedom of choice" statute, VA.
CODE § 32-195 (1978) (repealed 1979), which had required Blue Shield plans to
pay for a psychologist's services directly. In this prior suit, the Plans had been
nonsuited. See Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of
Va., 469 F. Supp. 552, 557 (E.D. Va. 1979).
5. A boycott in which "traders at one level ... seek to protect themselves
from competition from non-group members who are competing or seeking to
compete at that level ... by taking concerted action aimed at depriving the excluded [members] of some trade relationship which they would need to compete effectively at that level, L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF AmwrrEUST,
§ 83, at 229 (1977), is a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. See,
e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145-46 (1966); Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). See generally D.
KnIN'NER, FEDERAL ANTrrSUST LAw §§ 10.29-.30 (1980).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 9, 1945,
ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33, amended by Act of July 25, 1947, ch. 326, 61 Stat. 448, Act of
Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 852 § 4, 70 Stat. 908). The relevant portions of the McCarranFerguson Act are as follows:
[Tihe Sherman Act,... the Clayton Act,... [and] the Federal Trade
Commission Act... shall be applicable to the business of insurance to
the extent that such business is not regulated by State Law ...
Nothing contained in this chapter shall render said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation.
Id. §§ 1012-1013. For a discussion of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see notes 1327 infra and accompanying text.
7. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 469 F.
Supp. 552, 562 (E.D. Va. 1979).
8. Id. at 563.
9. The circuit court affirmed the district court's judgment that there was
no conspiracy between the two Blue Shield plans and the NSV. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476, 479-92 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981).
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that the practice was thus not exempt under the Act.10 Moreover, while the Court of Appeals refused to hold that the practice was a boycott,"1 it did hold that the practice was an
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.' 2 Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v.
Blue Shield of Virginia, 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981).
10. 624 F.2d at 483-84.
11. The circuit court said that, although the challenged practice resembled
a boycott, the "special considerations involved in the delivery of health services" prevented the court from applying a per se rule of illegality. Id. at 484.
By refusing to apply a per se rule of illegality, the court implicitly stated that
the practice was not a boycott; under the Sherman Act boycotts are treated as
per se illegal. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,
364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212
(1959).
12. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624
F.2d 476, 484-86 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981). After finding
a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the circuit court remanded the case
to the district court for appropriate relief. 624 F.2d at 486. On remand, the district court ordered the Richmond Plan and Roanoke Plan to give notice that the
physician billing practice violated the antitrust laws and to accept, process, and
pay all legitimate claims for services rendered by clinical psychologists after
January 1, 1972, and covered under a Blue Shield contract. Virginia Academy
of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., No. 78-0496-A (E.D. Va. Dec. 2,
1980).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disposed of defendants' arguments
that their activities were exempt from antitrust scrutiny on the basis of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Defendants had argued that because they had collaborated in a joint legal action designed to challenge the Virginia "freedom of
choice" statute, see note 4 supra, their collaboration in implementing the billing review procedure was exempt from antitrust scrutiny. 624 F.2d at 481. Implicitly based on the first amendment guarantee to petition the government, the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine exempts certain types of anticompetitive activities
from the strictures of the antitrust laws. Unless a petition is a mere sham, a
defendant's deliberate efforts to influence the government to take anticompetitive action cannot be the basis of antitrust liability. See UMW v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965) (lobbying effort designed to induce Secretary of Labor to set minimum wage so high that only larger government contractors
could afford to sell coal to the TVA protected by the Noerr precedent); Eastern
R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961)
(misleading advertising campaign designed to influence legislation placing
trucking industry at a competitive disadvantage protected by the first amendment). Courts have extended this exemption to protect administrative and judicial litigation. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508, 510-15 (1972) (extending exemption, but also holding that right-to-petition-government exemption does not extend to multiple harrassment suits
against competitors).
Because the Richmond and the Roanoke Plans had abandoned the declaratory judgment suit that they had instituted to challenge the statute, see note 4
supra, the Virginia Academy court found Noerr-Pennington inapplicable, concluding that the two plans were not exercising first amendment rights. 624 F.2d
at 482. Moreover, the court found that the two plans' collaboration over their
billing practices "amounted to no more than an agreement to persist in economically restrictive commercial activity in the face of a State law designed to
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Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act in response
to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in United States v.
South-Eastern UnderwritersAssociation,'3 in which the Court
held that the business of insurance constituted interstate commerce and as such was subject to federal antitrust laws. 14 Unwilling to deny states the opportunity to regulate the insurance
industry,15 and persuaded that an insurance company's reliable
underwriting16 of risks required cooperation among insurance
companies,' 7 Congress moved to limit the potential impact of
South-Eastern Underwriters by providing the insurance indusopen up the health care market," and that the collaboration would seriously
hamper states' efforts to encourage competition. Id.
The circuit court also found that the defendants' collaboration was not exempt from antitrust scrutiny under the doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1943), which exempts anticompetitive activity from the antitrust laws if
such activity is necessary in order to comply with state regulation. 624 F.2d at
482 n.10. In Virginia Academy, the state's regulation forced cooperation between the Richmond and Roanoke Plans in the administration of national accounts, by prohibiting the plans' operations outside of assigned territories. The
court noted that, although state regulation of these "national accounts" might
have necessitated cooperation, the regulation did not require the plans to administer the specific billing practice in question. Id.
13. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
14. Id. at 553-62. Prior to South-Eastern Underwriters, the Court had consistently interpreted the leading case of Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall) 168,
183 (1868) ("[lssuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce"),
to mean that the federal government had no jurisdiction over the insurance industry under the commerce clause. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer
Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 510-12 (1913); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178
U.S. 389, 401 (1900). In the absence of federal authority to regulate the insurance business, every state regulated the insurance business through a state insurance department. See generally J. DAY, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF
INSURANCE IN THE UNrrED STATES 1-23 (1970).
15. Two factors influenced Congress to restrict the potential impact of the
South-Eastern Underwriters decision: concern that state regulation and taxation of the insurance industry would be found unconstitutional under the commerce clause, see E. SAwYER, INSURANCE AS INTERSTATE COMMERCE 46-51 (1945);
and fear of a federal takeover of the insurance industry under the activist
Roosevelt administration, see 1947 NAIC PROCEEDING 69, 74-75 (address of Sen.
Ferguson, Dec. 11, 1946).
16. The term "underwriting" originated with the practice at the London
coffeehouse of Lloyd's where, from "earliest times," applicants passed proposed
policies among the merchants who subscribed or "underwrote" their name for
such portion as they wished to assume. 1 G. RICHAmDS, THE LAw OF INSUIRANCE
§ 11 n.4 (W. Freedman 5th ed. 1971). According to Black, to "underwrite"
means to "insure life or property." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1697 (4th rev. ed.
1968). Modern textbook writers use "underwriter" as a generic term for the insurer, see, e.g., 1 G. RICHARDS, supra, § 1, or the process of insuring, see, e.g., R.
KEETON, INSURANCE LAw § 1.3(a) (1971).
17. Congress viewed the South-Eastern Underwriters decision as potentially prohibiting cooperation among insurance companies in the joint ratemaking and statistical gathering ventures necessarily incident to the accurate
underwriting of risks. See 91 CONG. REC. 1481 (1945).
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try with a qualified exemption from the antitrust laws18 under
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.19 The Act renders the antitrust
laws 20 inapplicable to certain insurance practices that constitute the business of insurance, are regulated by state law, and
do not involve intimidation, coercion, or boycott.2 1 Of the three
requirements, the "business of insurance" requirement has
22
proved the most troublesome to define.
The lower courts initially interpreted the McCarran-Ferguson exemption broadly by applying the "business of insurance"
provision expansively. 23 For example, the court in Dexter v. Eq18. Just seventeen days after the South-Eastern Underwritersdecision, the
House passed the Walter-Hannock Bill, which completely exempted the insurance industry from the antitrust laws. See 90 CONG. REC. 6565 (1944). Congress
eventually rejected the complete exemption approach, however, and adopted a
compromise bill proposed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, which exempted from the antitrust laws those "business of insurance"
practices that were state regulated and did not constitute intimidation, coercion, or boycott. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012-1013 (1976). For a discussion of the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see Weller, The McCarranFergusonAct's Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DuKE LJ. 587, 588-608.
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).
20. The McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption applies to violations of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976), and
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1976). See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1012 (1976).
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012-1013 (1976). For the text of the material portions of
the statute, see note 6 supra. This Comment deals principally with the "business of insurance" provision of the Act. For brief discussions of the boycott
and state regulation provisions, see notes 26-27 infra and accompanying text.
22. See text accompanying notes 23-63 infra. One commentator has noted
that most of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption cases concern the "business of
insurance" provision. See Borsody, The Antitrust Laws and the Health Industry, 12 AxRoN L. REV. 417, 441 (1979).
23. The courts appeared to regard the business of insurance as any activity
in which an insurance company might engage. See, e.g., Addrisi v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725, 726-7 (9th Cir. 1974) (insurer's loan to homeowner conditioned on prospective borrower's purchase of life insurance policy
to secure loan found within business of insurance); California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857, 859-60 (N.D.
Cal. 1959) (fixing of insurance agent's commissions found within business of insurance). Although the CaliforniaLeague court found that the fixing of agent's
commissions was within the business of insurance, the court implicitly suggested an "effects-on-rates" test that narrowed the "business of insurance" exemption to only those activities "of an insurer that significantly or substantially
affect the rate charged policyholders." Nedrow, The McCarranControversy: Insurance and the Antitrust Law, 12 CoNN. L.R. 205, 210-11 (1980); see California
League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp.
857, 867 (N.D. Cal. 1959). For example, the settlement of claims was found to be
within the business of insurance under the "effects-on-rates" test because such
activity had a substantial effect on rate-making. See Manasen v. California
Dental Servs., 424 F. Supp. 657, 666 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The rationale underlying
the "effects-on-rates" test is that any activity having an effect on rates affects
the reliable status of insurance companies, see id. at 667, the maintenance of
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uitable Life Assurance Society 24 held that the business of insurance encompassed an insurer's practice of conditioning
loans to homeowners on the homeowners' purchase of life insurance policies as security.2 5 Moreover, the lower courts construed both the boycott 26 and state regulation 27 provisions of

such status being an important justification for the McCarran-Ferguson exemption, see note 17 supra and accompanying text. For representative cases using
the "effects-on-rates" test, see, e.g., Doctor's, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phil.,
431 F. Supp. 5, 10 (E.D. Pa. 1975), (Blue Cross' continuing renewal of hospital
agreements conditioned on elimination of wasteful practices and services found
within business of insurance); affd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) Traveler's Ins.
Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 481 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir.) (test used to find serviceprovider contracts in issue within business of insurance), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1093 (1973). But see Fry v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1151,
1154 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (insurer's farm loans to prospective borrower conditioned
on purchase of irrigation system and/or life insurance found outside the business of insurance). One can argue, however, that the Supreme Court rejected
the "effects-on-rates" test in Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440
U.S. 205 (1979). See note 38 inf/ra and accompanying text.
24. 527 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1975).
25. Id. at 235.
26. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, activities that constitute a boycott,
intimidation, or coercion are subject to the antitrust laws. Because "boycotts"
are defined restrictively, however, the Act's coverage is relatively expansive.
See Comment, Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.: A Re-Interpretation of
the Boycott Exception to the McCarranAct, 1977 DuKE I.J. 1069, 1069-73. See,
e.g., Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725, 728-29 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 372 F.
Supp. 509, 513-14 (S.D. Tex. 1974), affid, 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975); Transnational Ins. Co. v. Rosenlund, 261 F. Supp. 12, 26 (D. Ore. 1966). The Supreme
Court, however, has recently expanded the scope of the boycott exception and
thus has narrowed the exemption from the antitrust laws. See St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 552-54 (1978) (the term "boycott" is not
limited to concerted action against competitors of members of the boycotting
group, but includes concerted action against policyholders).
27. The McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts activities from the antitrust laws
only if the activities are state regulated. This provision of the Act has been
construed so that mere regulatory legislation that deals with insurance company practices, but does not actively regulate a specific practice, is sufficient to
satisfy McCarran-Ferguson requirements. See, e.g., FTC v. National Cas. Co.,
357 U.S. 560, 564-65 (1958) (state regulation existed even though state insurance
statutes prohibiting unfair and deceptive practices were "inchoate" and had not
'crystallized into 'administrative elaboration"' of standards of conduct nor
been applied in individual cases); Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451
F.2d 1178, 1181-83 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972); Schwartz v.
Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 564, 575-77 (E.D. Pa.), enforced,
384 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Although the courts have allowed almost any
state involvement to satisfy the state regulation requirement, commentators
have generally favored a test that would require more active state involvement
and therefore more accurately reflect the policy considerations underlying the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. See, e.g., Comment, State Regulation Under the McCarranAct, 47 TUL. L. REv. 1069 (1973); Note, State Supervision Over Insurance
Rate-Making Combinations Under the McCarranAct, 60 YALE IJ. 160 (1951).
The state regulation requirement of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was not at
issue in Virginia Academy. It is unclear, however, why the Academy did not
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the McCarran-Ferguson Act so as to afford insurance practices
substantial protection from the antitrust laws.
The first two major Supreme Court decisions delineating
the scope of the "business of insurance" provision were SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.28 and SEC v. National Securities,Inc. 2 9 In Variable Annuity, the Court held that an insurer's assumption of investment risk inheres in the concept of
insurance. 30 In further defining the scope of the "business of
insurance" provision, the Court in NationalSecurities held that
"[It]he relationship between insurer and insured, the type of
policy which could be issued, [and the policy's] reliability, interpretation, and enforcement" were "the core of the 'business
of insurance.' "31 The Court also acknowledged that other activities of insurance companies so strongly related to the companies' status as reliable insurers that those activities would fall
within the scope of the "business of insurance" provision.32
raise the state regulation issue. Apparently, the Blue Shield plans' challenge to
the "freedom of choice" statute, which prohibited their physician-supervised
billing practice, was still active in the Virginia courts when the VirginiaAcademy appeal was argued, thus rendering consideration of the state regulation issue inappropriate.
28. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
29. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
30. 359 U.S. at 71-73. A variable annuity contact entitles the purchaser not
to a specified income per annum, but to a fluctuating income based on a pro
rata participation in investment portfolios. Because the issuer of such an annuity assumes no investment risk, the Court found that the contract was not the
business of insurance under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id.
31. 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969). The plaintiff charged violations of section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and of Rule 10b-5 because the defendant
insurance company's proxy materials made allegedly fraudulent representations to stockholders about a merger with a competing firm. The defendant interposed the McCarran-Ferguson Act as a defense. In its analysis, the Court
found the insurance aspects of the merger subject to state regulation and other
aspects of the merger subject to the Securities Exchange Act. Incident to this
analysis, the Court defined the business of insurance for McCarran-Ferguson
Act purposes. See id.
32. Id. The Court listed rate fixing, selling and advertising policies, and licensing companies and their agents as examples of activities that constitute
the business of insurance. Id.
In the ten years since National Securities, the issue of the scope of the
business of insurance has arisen in four contexts: (1) tying arrangements, see,
e.g., Zelson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 549 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1977); (2) agency
relationships, see, e.g., DeVoto v. Pacific Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 516 F.2d 1 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 894 (1975); (3) insurance company mergers, see, e.g.,
American Gen. Ins. Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
20,163 (F.T.C. Dec. 5, 1972); and, (4) service provider contracts, see, e.g., Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1973). For a discussion of how courts have narrowed the scope of the business of insurance
provision in all four areas, see Nedrow, supra note 23, at 213-45. Courts have
narrowed the business of insurance provision out of recognition that the McCarran-Ferguson exemption is justified only because of certain unique charac-
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In Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,33
the Supreme Court re-examined and significantly narrowed the
scope of the business of insurance provision. 34 First, the Court
identified the "primary elements" of the business of insurance
35
as the underwriting and spreading of a policyholder's risk.
Second, the Court described the contractual relationship between insurer and insured as "[a] nother commonly understood
aspect of the business of insurance," 36 and in doing so perhaps
demoted this relationship from the status given it in National
37
FurSecurities as the "core" of the business of insurance.
ther, the Court rejected the argument that the cost-saving impact of insurer agreements with providers of services
necessitates a finding that those agreements constitute the
teristics, see notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text (joint rate-making), of
the insurance industry. See, e.g., DeVoto v. Pacific Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 516
F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 894 (1975); American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Planned Marketing Assocs., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 1141, 1146-47 (E.D.
Va. 1974). Hence, it could be argued that the exemption should not be interpreted to give insurance companies engaging in non-insurance activities the
competitive advantage of a federal antitrust exemption. See, e.g., Allied Financial Servs., Inc. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 157, 161-62 (D. Neb. 1976) (insurance company interference with agency relationships does not constitute
the business of insurance).
33. 440 U.S. 205 (1979). Royal Drug involved an antitrust challenge to
agreements between defendant Group Life (a Blue Shield plan) and several codefendant pharmacies. The agreements, called provider contracts, were part of
a prescription drug insurance plan offered by Group Life that allowed its policyholders to obtain prescribed medications for no more than a two dollar deductible payment if they patronized one of the codefendant pharmacies. Group
Life then reimbursed the pharmacy for the wholesale cost of the drugs. If policyholders chose to patronize a pharmacy that did not have a contract with
Group Life, they would pay the entire out-of-pocket cost and then apply to
Group Life for partial reimbursements. Consequently, policyholders found it
both less convenient and more expensive to patronize nonparticipating pharmacies. Nonparticipating pharmacies alleged that the agreements caused policyholders to boycott them, were a form of price fixing, and excluded small
pharmacies from the market. Id. at 207-09.
34. Id. at 232-33. At least one commentator has argued that Royal Drug effectively limits the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption to such innocuous activities as statistics gathering, standardization of forms, and joint underwriting.
See Nedrow, supra note 23, at 241-45.
35. 440 U.S. at 211. In finding that the "primary elements" of the business
of insurance were the underwriting and spreading of risks, the Court relied
upon textbook definitions of the term "insurance," including those from 1 G.
COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 1:3 (2d ed. 1959); R. KEETON, supra

note 16, § 1.2(a); 1 G. RIcHARDs, supra note 16, § 2. 440 U.S. at 211.
36. 440 U.S. at 215.
37. For a discussion of National Securities, see notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text. The impact of Royal Drug on NationalSecurities is unclear,
but courts have continued to rely on the National Securities definition of the
"core" of the business of insurance. See note 55 infra.
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business of insurance. 38 The Court also warned of the "serious
anticompetitive consequences" of exempting provider agreements from the antitrust laws.39 Applying the Royal Drug definition of the business of insurance to the practice at issue, a
divided Court 40 held that the contract between Blue Shield of
Texas and participating pharmacies for the provision of drugs
4
to policyholders did not constitute the business of insurance. 1
Although it is clear that Royal Drug narrows the business
of insurance exemption, it is also apparent that the boundaries
of the narrowed exemption are blurred. 42 While the Court in
38. 440 U.S. at 213-14. Although the Court rejected the argument that all
cost-savings activities must be included in the definition of business of insurance, the Court did not adopt the view that such conduct is not the business of
insurance simply because it reduces risks. See id. at 232-33. The Court reasoned that acceptance of the effects-on-rates test raised an insuperable linedrawing problem: "If agreements between an insurer and retail pharmacists
are the 'business of insurance' because they reduce the insurer's costs, then so
are all other agreements insurers may make to keep their costs under control."
Id. at 232; see id. at 232 n.A0.
39. Id. at 232 n.40..
40. Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall
and Powell, dissented. Justice Brennan criticized the majority's approach to
the elements of the business of insurance because it encompasses only those
activities that were included in the concept of the business of insurance when
the McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted, and because it is unrelated to the underlying aims of the McCarran-Ferguson Act or to a common sense understanding of insurance. Id. at 239 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 233. Royal Drug was the first Supreme Court case to find that a
contract between an insurer and a third party to provide services to claimants
of the insurer-a provider contract-was not within the scope of the business of
insurance. Prior to Royal Drug, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had held
that provider contracts were within the business of insurance. See Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 481 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1093 (1973). In Travelers Ins. Co., an insurance company brought an antitrust
action against a nonprofit provider of prepaid medical health care. At issue was
the validity of the standard contract Blue Cross had entered into with 101 hospitals that provided services to Blue Cross subscribers. The Travelers Ins. Co.
court found that the service provider contract was within the scope of the business of insurance and that the practice was shielded from antitrust attack by
the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. at 82-83; accord, Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross
of Greater Phil., 554 F.2d 1253, 1254 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977);
Manasen v. California Dental Servs., 424 F. Supp. 657, 666 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
Royal Drug, in finding that insurer-third party provider contracts did not
fall within the business of insurance, apparently overruled this substantial
body of precedent. The Royal Drug Court explicitly reserved, however, the
question of whether Blue Shield policyholder contracts were within the business of insurance: 'This is not to say that the contracts offered by Blue Shield
to its policyholders, as distinguished from its provider agreements with participating pharmacies, may not be the 'business of insurance' within the meaning
of the Act." 440 U.S. at 230 n.37.
42. The commentators have had difficulty in determining the scope of the
post-Royal Drug "business of insurance" provision. See, e.g., Note, Group Life
& Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co.: The McCarran-FergusonAct and Health
Service Plans, 5 AM. J. L. & MED. 393, 409-10 (1980); Note, The Definition of the
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Royal Drug held that a practice must "involve" the "primary
elements" of underwriting and spreading of risk to constitute
the business of insurance,4 3 it did not specify the nature of the
required "involvement." Since almost any insurance practice
involves the underwriting of risk to some degree, lower courts
must determine the precise nature of involvement a practice
must have with the underwriting and spreading of risk before
that practice constitutes the business of insurance.
In identifying a practice as the business of insurance, the
Court in Royal Drug also held that the contractual relationship
between insurer and insured is a "commonly understood" factor.44 The Royal Drug opinion fails to answer the question of
precisely how important the insurer-insured contract-either
alone or in relation to the underwriting and spreading of riskis in the identification of the business of insurance. Thus,
lower courts are again left with the task of determining the importance of the insurer-insured relationship in identifying what
45
constitutes the business of insurance.
Two courts have recently confronted claims that the practice of reviewing bills submitted to insurance companies is
within the post-Royal Drug definition of the business of insurance. 46 In Pireno v. New York State ChiropracticAssociation4 7
"Businessof Insurance" Underthe McCarran-FergusonAct after Royal Drug, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1475, 1478 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Note].
43. For example, the Court stated that "[the Pharmacy Agreements thus
do not involve any underwriting or spreading of risk." 440 U.S. at 214.
44. 440 U.S. at 211, 215. The significance of the Court's distinction between
"primary elements" and a "commonly understood" factor is unclear.
45. Lower courts have experienced further difficulty because of Royal
Drug's inconsistent use of definitional terms. See Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938
(1980); Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic Ass'n, [1979] 2 TRADE CASES
78,373 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1979). The Royal Drug Court initially stated that the
primary elements of an insurance contract, not the business of insurance, are
the underwriting and spreading of risk. 440 U.S. at 211. Unless the Court was
using "insurance contract" to mean "business of insurance," it could be argued
that the primary elements of the business of insurance and an insurance contract are not identical. Because the Court elsewhere speaks of the primary elements of the business of insurance (as opposed to an insurance contract),
perhaps the Court did mean to associate the two.
Moreover, the sources the Court relied on in Royal Drug to identify the elements of the business of insurance state that the elements are the transfer
and distribution of risk, rather than the underwriting and distribution of risk.
See 1 G. CoucH, supra note 35, § 1:3; R. KEETON, supra note 16, § 1.2(a); 1 G.
RICHARDS, supra note 16, § 2. Again, perhaps the Royal Drug Court used "underwriting" to mean "transfer." Because the Court gives no indication of why
it6 substitutes "underwriting" for "transfer," courts and commentators are left
to conjecture what this substitution means.
46. Another recent case, State v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, [1979] 1
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and Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractic Association,48 the
challenged practices, like those in Virginia Academy, 49 were
billing procedures allegedly used to review the need for and
cost of a provider's services.5 0 Further, the practices were factually similar to the practices examined in Royal Drug in that a
third party provider was involved in delivering health care and
an insurance company was attempting to impose cost constraints on the third party's delivery of such services.S1. The
practices were different in that they were not specified in a con52
tract between an insurer and a provider of health care.
The courts in both Pireno and Bartholomew found that the
53
function of the committee that reviewed policyholders' bills
was to interpret the rights of the policyholder under the contract.5 4 The key step in both courts' analyses was to identify
TRADE CASES (CCH) 77,893 (D. Ariz. June 5, 1979), involved the question of
whether maximum payment schedules, approved by a physician association
and followed by private insurance companies that participated in so-called
foundation plans, constituted the business of insurance under Royal Drug. The
court held that the fee schedules acted only to reduce the risk that the insurers
had underwritten and did not directly involve the underwriting of risks. Id. at
77,894. Thus, the Maricopa court found the maximum payment practices
outside the scope of the "business of insurance" provision of the McCarranFerguson Act. Id. The principal cases under discussion, however, see notes 4673 infra and accompanying text, deal with whether different types of fee and
service review practices constitute the business of insurance under the Act.
47. [1979] 2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 78,373 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1979).
48. 612 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980).
49. See 624 F.2d at 485; notes 1-3, 59 infra and accompanying text.
50. Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812, 814 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980); Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic
Ass'n, [1979] 2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 78,373, 78,374 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1979).
51. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 209
(1979); Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812, 814 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980); Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic
Ass'n, [1979]. 2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 78,373, 78,374-75 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1979).
52. See id.
53. In both Pireno and Bartholomew, insurance companies employed peer
review boards composed of chiropractors who reviewed chiropractic bills submitted by policyholders to their insurance companies for payment and then, after investigating the circumstances surrounding the service and after referring
to a schedule of "usual and customary" fees, made a nonbinding recommendation for payment. The insurance companies reimbursed their policyholders accordingly. In both cases, chiropractors who were not members of the state
chiropractic association administering the review board brought suit alleging
that the insurance companies and the state chiropractic association conspired
to fix prices. Defendants successfully interposed a McCarran-Ferguson Act defense. Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812, 813-17 (4th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980); Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic Ass'n, [1979] 2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 78,373, 78,374-78 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1979).
54. Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812, 817 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980); Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic
Ass'n, [1979] 2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 78,373, 78,377 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1979).
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the relationship between insurer and insured as the "core" or
the "essence" of the business of insurance. 55 Moreover, the
federal district court in Pireno, unlike the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in Bartholomew, went on to analogize the
committee to an agent of the insurance company akin to a licensed adjuster.5 6 The Pireno court also found that the committee's decision involved the spreading of risk in the same
sense that the licensed adjuster's decisions involved the
spreading of risk: each determined whether loss would remain
with the insured or would pass to the insurer and be distrib5
uted to the policyholders through higher premiums. 7
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Virginia Academy represents the most recent attempt to define the business of insurance in the antitrust context. In contrast to its decision in
Bartholomew,5 8 the court in Virginia Academy found the bill55. Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812, 817 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980); Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic
Ass'n, [1979] 2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 78,373, 78,377 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1979). In so
doing, both courts quoted National Securities. See SEC v. National Securities,
Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969). For a discussion of National Securities, see notes
28-32 supra and accompanying text. The courts' analytical treatment of the insurer-insured contract suggests that they have not accepted the argument that
the relationship between insurer and insured has been changed by Royal
Drug's treatment of the component parts of the business of insurance. See
notes 36-37, 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
56. [1979] 2 TRADE CASES (CCH) at 78,377.
57. Id. Pireno, consistent with Royal Drug, see note 45 supra, apparently
used the term "spreading" to mean "underwriting." For a discussion of the underwriting of risks, see note 16 supra. Moreover, the process that Pireno describes as the spreading of risk is in fact the transfer and distribution of loss.
According to Pireno, the peer review committee determines "the extent to
which an individual insured must bear the full cost of chiropractic services, or
instead have that cost borne by the insurer (and, through higher premiums, his
fellow insureds)." Id. The committee thus determines whether the loss (cost)
is transferred (borne by insurer or insured), and that decision determines
whether the loss is distributed to the policyholders through higher rates.
58. It appears that the composition of the Fourth Circuit court, rather than
the facts of the two cases, distinguishes VirginiaAcademy from Bartholomew.
In Bartholomew, argued and decided approximately ten months before Virginia Academy, Federal District Judge D. Dortch Warriner, sitting by designation, and Senior Circuit Judge Albert V. Bryan joined to form a two to one
majority over Circuit Judge K.K. Hall, who concurred in part, but dissented to
the majority's finding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempted the defendant's activity from the antitrust laws. Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractors
Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812, 818 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980). In the
Virginia Academy district court decision, Judge Warriner was the presiding
judge. 469 F. Supp. 552, 554 (E.D. Va. 1979). At the circuit level, Judge Hall,
who had dissented in Bartholomew, authored the opinion reversing Judge Warriner, and was joined by Circuit Judge D. Phillips and District Judge Joseph C.
Howard, sitting by designation. 624 F.2d at 478. The majority in VirginiaAcademy cites Bartholomew for the proposition that the "essence of the business of
insurance is the relationship between the insurance company and its policy-

1981]

BUSINESS OF INSURANCE

1199

ing review practice outside the business of insurance as defined in Royal Drug. In determining whether physician review
of a psychologist's bills59 fell within the "business of insurance"
exemption, the court of appeals interpreted the definition of the
business of insurance narrowly and refused to extend McCarran-Ferguson immunity to the defendant's activities. 6 0 The Virginia Academy court reasoned that the physician billing
practice did not involve the underwriting or distribution of any
specific risk because underwriting involves only the initial decision to cover a disorder, and the Richmond and Roanoke Plans'
policies had covered nervous disorders for ten years prior to
the initiation of the billing review procedures. 6 1 The court
found that the practice resulted from a decision to use certain
providers of health care for the purpose of effecting a cost savings-the same type of decision involved in Royal Drug 62-- and
thus, did not constitute the business of insurance.' More generally, the court's narrow construction of the McCarran-Ferguson
exemption reflected its concern about the anticompetitive ef63
fects of physician dominance of group health plans.
holder," but ignores the factual similarities in the cases and, without specifically overruling Bartholomew, comes to the opposite conclusion concerning
these facts. Id. at 483.
59. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text. In addition to reviewing
the psychologist's bill, the physician could also treat the policyholder and/or
supervise the psychologist's treatment. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 469 F. Supp. 552, 556 (E.D. Va. 1979).
60. 624 F.2d at 480, 484. The district court, on the other hand, identified the
"core of the business of insurance" as the relationship between insurer and
policyholder. 469 F. Supp. 552, 562 (E.D. Va. 1979). The district court then reasoned that since the billing practice was specified in a provision of the contract
between the insurer and the policyholder, the practice was squarely within the
business of insurance. Id.
As in Pireno and Bartholomew, the Virginia Academy district court invoked NationalSecurities for the definition of the core of the business of insurance. See generally text accompanying note 31 supra. The court also used
footnote 37 of the Royal Drug opinion ("[t]his is not to say that the contracts
offered by Blue Shield to its policyholders, as distinguished from its provider
agreements with participating pharmacies, may not be the 'business of insurance' within the meaning of the Act") to distinguish Virginia Academy from
Royal Drug. See 624 F.2d at 562. For a discussion of Royal Drug's footnote 37,
see note 41 supra.
61. 624 F.2d at 480, 484.
62. See id.; note 38 supra and accompanying text.
63. See id. at 479 n.2, 480. In discussing this concern, the court cited footnote 40 of the Royal Drug opinion. Id. at 479 n.2. The Royal Drug footnote
noted the "serious anticompetitive consequences" that might follow from physician domination. 440 U.S. at 232 n.40.
The Virginia Academy appellate court used provider dominance not only
to justify finding a conspiracy within the reach of the Sherman Act, 624 F.2d at
479-81, but also to justify interpreting the McCarran-Ferguson exemption narrowly. Id. at 483-84. In finding an antitrust violation, the circuit court agreed
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The Virginia Academy court failed to interpret correctly
the Royal Drug definition of the business of insurance. The
Court in Royal Drug merely indicated that exemptions from
the antitrust laws should be construed narrowly,64 not that they
should be eliminated entirely.65 Presumably, the theoretical
limits beyond which an exemption cannot be narrowed are determined by reference to the policy concerns that justified the
exemption originally. 66 In passing the McCarran-Ferguson exemption, Congress attempted to foster state regulated insurance company practices that furthered the interest of insurer
stability and solvency by protecting these practices from antitrust scrutiny.67 By narrowly circumscribing the argument that
the cost-saving impact of provider agreements justifies exempting those agreements from the antitrust laws, 68 the Court in
Royal Drug seemed to suggest that the underlying policy of insurer solvency should provide only limited guidance to courts
in interpreting the statute. 69 Thus, Royal Drug indicates that
courts should determine whether a specific practice is exempt
by applying the formal definition of the business of insurance
articulated in the case.7 0 Because this definition is unclear and
because courts interpret the McCarran-Ferguson exemption
narrowly,7 1 courts are likely to narrow this definition even further than the Royal Drug Court did.
Although the Virginia Academy court followed Royal
with the lower court that a rule of reason approach was appropriate and refused to characterize the practice as an illegal per se boycott. Id. at 484-85. The
circuit court disagreed, however, with the lower court's finding that the practice
was justified and that psychiatrists and psychologists were not in competition.
Id. at 485.
64. 440 U.S. at 231. See generally 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUrES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.03-.13 (4th ed. 1973) (discussing rules of statutory construction of exceptions, provisos, savings clauses, and savings statutes); Mintz,
The Standard of Patentability in the United States-Another Point of View,
1977 DET. C. L. REV. 755, 774-77, 785-88 (examines Court's hostility toward patent
laws because of those laws' anticompetitive effects).
65. One commentator has stated that the "older rule" favors strict interpretation of exceptions, provisos, savings clauses, and savings statutes. 2A J.
SUTHERLAND, supra note 64, § 47.11. Another view favors determining the effects of such provisions by reference to their underlying policy justification

without reference to artificially narrowing presumptions. Id. The Supreme
Court, however, adheres to the "older rule" of strict construction of statutory
exemptions from the antitrust laws. See, e.g., United States v. McKesson &
Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 316, 319-20 (1956).
66. 2A J. SUTHrRLAND, supra note 64, § 47.11.
67. See notes 13-19 supra and accompanying text.
68. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
69. See 440 U.S. at 216-17.
70. See id. at 215-17.
71. See note 64 supra.
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Drug's formalistic approach 72 in determining the scope of the
business of insurance, the court should also have analyzed the
practical realities of the insurance industry in making its determination. Rather than comparing the billing review procedures
to the third-party provider agreements that had been held not
to constitute the business of insurance in Royal Drug, the Virginia Academy court should have rigorously developed the insurance adjuster analogy advanced in Pireno.7 3
An insurance claims adjuster, normally a representative of
either the insurance company or the policyholder, determines
the obligations of the insurer and insured based upon his or
her investigation of the claim.7 4 In the settlement of claims, the
72. By adopting an essentially formal approach towards determining the
scope of an exemption from the antitrust laws instead of a policy-based approach, the Court in Royal Drug echoed the style of argument that the Court
had used in United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956). The
issue in McKesson & Robbins was whether price-fixing agreements fell within
the so-called "fair-trade" provisions of the Miller-Tydings Act or McGuire Act
exemptions from the antitrust laws. The opposing parties argued that the
scope of the exemptions should be set with reference to the economic considerations underlying the statutes, id. at 315, but the Court's response was simply
that "[w]e need not concern ourselves with such [economic] speculation. Congress has marked the limitations beyond which price fixing cannot go." Id. at
316-17. The Court's ensuing construction of the two exemptions was termed
"verbalistic," "arbitrary," and overly subtle by Justices Harlan, Frankfurter,
and Burton in dissent. Id. at 316, 318-20 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For Justice
Brennan's essentially similar response in dissent to the majority's construction
of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption in Royal Drug, see note 40 supra. The
message of Royal Drug and McKesson & Robbins is apparently that the Court
will eschew economically-based policy arguments in favor of formal arguments
as the preferred method of fixing the boundaries of exemptions from the antitrust laws. This formal approach presumably reflects the Court's longstanding
aversion to becoming embroiled in judging the merits of complex economic arguments. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. State, 431 U.S. 720, 737-44 (1977); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 492-94 (1968). But
see United States v. E.L duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 399-404 (1976)
(Supreme Court engaged in extensive analysis of relevant competing markets).
73. See [1979] 2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 78,373, 78,377 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1979);
text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
74. 16 J. APPLEMAN, INsURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE § 8646, at 77 (rev. ed.
1968). There are four tyes of adjusters. Bureau or company adjusters work for
insurance company-owned adjustment organizations. W. MOORE, A PRIMER ON
AD STmENTs 12-16 (5th ed. 1963). Staff adjusters work directly for insurance
companies. Id. Independent adjusters, who may be affiliated with an adjustment organization, work for insurance companies. Id. Finally, public adjusters
work for policyholders. Id. at 16-17. In addition, insurance brokers, insurance
agents, and attorneys may work incidentally to adjust claims, but are not permitted to advertise their services as public adjusters. E. PATTERSON, ESSENTILS OF INSURANCE LAw § 8, at 47 (2d ed. 1957). For a discussion of which types
of adjusters are used to investigate different types of insurance claims, see W.
MOORE, supra, at 49-51. Since the adjuster's practices are the same regardless
of employment status, the question of whether an adjuster's practices constitute the business of insurance under the McCarran-Ferguson Act is unrelated
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adjuster is the decision maker with the greatest authority to fix
liability. 75 Thus, the adjuster is commonly considered the most
powerful and visible representative of the insurer in the day-to76
day operation of claims settlement.

Claims adjusting is within the Royal Drug definition of the
business of insurance because the decisions of the adjuster determine who shall bear the loss. Hence, the adjuster's deciSions "involve" the underwriting of risk in a fundamental way:
they are a culmination of routine practices expressly designed
to determine whether the loss falls within the class of risks that
the insurer underwrote on the issuance of the policy.7 7 Moreover, claims adjusting is the business of insurance because the
adjuster's decisions interpret the contractual obligations of insurer and insured 78 by determining the extent of the insurer's
liability.7 9 Such decisions intimately affect the contractual relationship between the two parties, thus satisfying the second aspect of the business of insurance under Royal Drug.80
The billing review practice that was at issue in Virginia
Academy8l is within the business of insurance provision because the practice is a special type of adjusting practice. In effect, the billing reviewer is an adjuster whose task is limited to
investigating the justifications of a bill for services about which
the reviewer has expert knowledge. 82 In executing the review
to the question of who employs the adjuster. An argument can be made that an
adjuster may tend to favor his or her employer in ambiguous cases, but such a
potential bias is a separate issue from whether the adjuster is engaged in the
business of insurance, unless such bias is so extreme that the adjuster analogy
fails entirely. See text accompanying notes 90-101 infra.
75.

See, e.g., H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT- THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF IN-

sURANcE CLAns ADJUSTMENTS 18 (1970) (the adjuster is the "key figure ...
[who is] the front-line representative of the insurance company... [and who]
occupies the most powerful role in settlement"); Gilman, Claims Administration in Life and Health Insurance, in LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE HANDBOOK
1042, 1043-44 (2d ed. D. Gregg 1964).
76. See H. Ross, supra note 75, at 18; Gilman, supra note 75, at 1042-44.
77. See notes 36, 44 supra and accompanying text; cf. Pireno v. New York
State Chiropractic Ass'n, [1979] 2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 78,373, 78,377 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 16, 1979) (court noted that peer review committee "serve[d] to define the
precise extent of [the insurer's] contractual obligations to its insureds under
their policies").
78. See notes 37-38, 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
79. Cf. Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic Ass'n, [1979] 2 TRADE CASES
(CCH) 78,373, 78,377 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1979) (court noted that review committee "determine[d] the extent to which an individual [bore] the.., cost of...
services, or instead [had] the cost borne by the insurer"). See generally
Gilman, supra note 75, at 1045-46.
80. See notes 36-37, 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
81. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
82. There are four basic steps to any claims examination procedure: iden-
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practice examined in Virginia Academy, the insurer found the
physician (not the psychologist) adequately trained to diagnose the physical and nervous causes of psychological disorders. 83 Since the insurance policy in question explicitly limited
coverage to medically necessary treatment,8 4 it was the function of the physician-reviewer to determine if a physician's or a
psychologist's treatment was medically necessary and hence
within the coverage of the insurance policy.8 5 If either type of

treatment was merited, the physician-reviewer "interpreted"
the contractual relationship of insurer and insured and found
that the patient's ailment fell within the class of risks-disabilities for which the treatment of a physician or psychologist is
medically necessary-underwritten by the policy. Thus, the
billing review practice examined by the court in Virginia Academy satisfied the Royal Drug definition of the business of in-

surance. 86

tification of the insured; determination of benefits claimed; determination of
policy status; and determination of the extent of liability. See Gilman, supra
note 75, at 1045-46. For a short explanation of the mechanics of claims adjustment, see W. MOORE, supra note 74, at 53-78. For an analysis of the legal and
sociological ramifications of claims adjusting, see generally H. Ross, supra note
75.
83. See 624 F.2d at 484-85.
84. See note 2 supra.
85. See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text.
86. Although any billing review practice that is substantially similar to
claims adjusting would satisfy the Royal Drug definition, the billing practice
will not be within the McCarran-Ferguson exemption, see notes 6, 13-21 supra,
if it involves intimidation, coercion, or boycott. See 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (1976). The
exemption permits courts to withhold McCarran-Ferguson protection from illegitimate billing review practices even though the practices satisfy the Royal
Drug test for the business of insurance under the adjuster analogy rationale.
Further regulation of review practices is provided by the state provision of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which must be satisfied before a practice is shielded
from antitrust scrutiny. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. In Virginia
Academy, the court determined that the review practice was not a boycott, see
624 F.2d at 484, but did not reach the issue of whether the state statute prohibiting the billing practices satisfied the state regulation provision. See note 27
supra.
It has also been argued that under Royal Drug any practice which has a
"risk-reducing" effect is not the business of insurance. See Columbia Note,
supra note 42, at 1487. Royal Drug Court merely stated that risk-reducing is
not, ipso facto, determinative of whether a practice is the business of insurance. See 440 U.S. at 214, note 38 supra. Even if one assumes that the argument concerning the relationship between risk-reduction and the business of
insurance is correct, the review practice at issue in Virginia Academy is still
the business of insurance. In Virginia Academy, the physician-reviewer decided, in essence, whether a patient's ailments fell within the class of risksillness for which a physician's or psychologist's services was medically necessary-covered by the policy. See notes 81-86 supra and accompanying text.
Thus, the risk-reducing analysis is irrelevant to the adjuster analogy as applied
to the facts of Virginia Academy.
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The circuit court's reasoning-that because the Richmond
and Roanoke Plans' policies covered nervous and mental disorders from 1962 to 1972, the billing review practice instituted in
1972 did not involve the underwriting of risks87-is
simply a
non sequitur. The risk covered by Blue Shield policies from
1962 to 1972 was the risk of nervous or mental disorders. The
risk covered after 1972 was the risk of nervous or mental disorders for which the services of a physician or a psychologist
were medically necessary. 88 Because the physician-reviewer
determined whether treatment was medically necessary, the
physician-reviewer decided whether the patient's illness fell
89
within the class of risks that Blue Shield had underwritten.
The validity of the adjuster analogy depends in part on the
neutrality of the physician-reviewer. If the reviewer is a competitor 0 who might employ an exclusionary course of conduct
toward clinical psychologists or engage in a scheme of horizontal price fixing, the adjuster analogy is inappropriate. A determination of the reviewer's status is usually made only after the
court makes the threshold determination that the practice at issue involves the business of insurance. 91 Yet the neutrality of
87. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
88. See notes 1-2 supra.
89. See notes 2, 86 supra and accompanying text.
90. The Virginia Academy court apparently treats Blue Shield plans as inherent violations of the antitrust laws. See 624 F.2d at 479-81. The court explicitly stated that there was sufficient physician control to bring the Richmond
Plan "within the purview of Section 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 481. Nevertheless, the relationship between the Blue Shield plans' status vis-a-vis the antitrust laws and the antitrust status of the specific billing review practice in
question is unclear.
The district court record indicates that the Richmond Plan and the Roanoke Plan had established no clear policy concerning the indemnification of a
psychologist's services. See 469 F. Supp. 552, 558 (E.D. Va. 1979). Hence, the
billing practice enabled the Blue Shield plans to extend coverage to psychological services, while simultaneously ensuring that either a physician's or a psychologist's services was "medically necessary" and thus within the terms of the
policy contract. See note 2 supra.
The billing practice, then, appears to have encouraged-not discouragedcompetition; before the practice, Blue Shield policies covered only psychological services rendered by a psychiatrist, whereas after the practice was adopted
Blue Shield policies covered psychological services rendered by potentially
competing groups: psychiatrists and psychologists. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 10, Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Virginia, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1980).
91. See, e.g., Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205,
210 (1979); Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812, 816 (4th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980); State v. Maricopa County Med.
Soc'y, [1979] 1 TRADE CASES (CCH) 77,893 (D. Ariz. June 5, 1979); Pireno v. New
York State Chiropractic Ass'n, [1979] 2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 78,373 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 16, 1979).
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the adjuster is also relevant when analyzing the validity of the
adjuster analogy itself.92
In assessing the potential for harm to the competitive delivery of mental health services, the Virginia Academy court
should have determined whether psychologists and physicians
together or psychologists alone form the relevant market
arena,93 and whether physicians and psychiatrists act together
to exclude psychologists from entering a particular market for
mental health services or to control the prices of such services.
If, as the district court in Virginia Academy assumed, 94 physi-

cians and psychologists together compete with psychiatrists,
and physicians do not engage in concerted efforts to direct patients to psychiatrists, the adjuster analogy is appropriate.9 5 If,
however, psychiatrists tell physicians who review psychologists' bills that they will not deal with the physicians if the physicians continue to approve psychologists' bills as medically
necessary, and the physicians acquiesce to those threats, the
reviewing physicians more closely resemble competitors en6
gaged in a group boycott than they do insurance adjusters.
Moreover, if physicians refuse to approve all psychologists'
treatment as medically necessary, and instead funnel the most
lucrative cases to psychiatrists or refused to approve bills that
failed to maintain minimum prices for services, the physicians
again appear more like competitors engaged in an illegal boy92. The Pireno court failed to develop fully the analogy, and thus did not
'consider these issues. See text accompanying note 73 supra. See generally
note 74 supra.
93. The court was not clear whether it viewed psychologists' competitors
to be psychiatrists or physicians. The court repeatedly compared psychologists
and psychiatrists as providers of psychological services, see 624 F.2d at 484-86,
leading the reader to believe that the court viewed those two groups as competitors. The extensive treatment that the court gave to the anticompetitive effects
of physician domination of Blue Shield plans, however, leads the reader to view
physicians as psychologists' competitors.
94. 469 F. Supp. at 560-61.
95. Even if the adjuster analogy is appropriate and a court were to find the
questioned practice within the business of insurance, the court would still have
to analyze whether the remaining two provisions of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act have been satisfied. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212
(1959) (defining group boycotts as "concerted refusals by traders to deal with
other traders"). Whether an actual group boycott existed would depend on
whether the plaintiff could demonstrate an effect on interstate commerce and
an injury to some segment of the public. See, e.g., Riggall v. Washington
County Med. Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266, 268 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 954
(1958); Bauer, Per Se Illegality of ConcertedRefusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for
Reexamination, 79 COLuM. L. Rv. 685, 689-692 (1979); Borsody, supra note 22,
at 447-55; Stewart & Roberts, Viability of the Antitrust Per Se Illegality Rules:
Schwinn Down, How Many to Go?, 58 WAsH. UJ.Q. 727, 745-49 (1980).
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cott 97 or in horizontal price-fixing 98 than like adjusters.
To determine the validity of the adjuster and competitor
analogies, the Virginia Academy court should have conducted
a thorough analysis of the relevant market, considering the
market power or dominance of each health care provider. 99 In
addition, the court should have examined any policies or sys-

tems that tended to insure compliance with group anticompetitive activity' 0 0 or to promote objective evaluation of
psychologists' claims. Finally, the court should have examined
any tendencies of the billing review system to promote a future
takeover of the market by one group of providers.' 0 ' If, after
examining these factors, the VirginiaAcademy court had concluded that the district court was correct in finding that the billing review practice merely represented a formal standard
medical procedure and did not create any significant anticompetitive effects, 0 2 the court should have invoked the adjuster
analogy to satisfy the "business of insurance" provision of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Thus, by failing to apply rigorously the adjuster analysis to
the billing review practice in issue, the Virginia Academy court
failed to forward a useful interpretation of the Royal Drug definition of the business of insurance for McCarran-Ferguson Act
purposes. Moreover, by finding the billing review practice to be
97. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364
U.S. 656 (1961) (mandatory approval of heating equipment by association of
utilities and heating equipment manufacturers was illegal boycott).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)
(price stabilization, even if beneficial to the market, illegal per se under § 1 of
the Sherman Act).
99. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295-97
(1949). Such a market analysis is admittedly complex in the mental health context. Compare Dorken & Webb, 1976 Third-Party Reimbursement Experience:
An Interstate Comparison by Insurance Carrier,35 AM. PSYCH. 355, 362 (1980)
(noting anticompetitive and monopolistic obstacles sometimes faced by psychologists because of Blue Shield practices and describing evidence gathered
by the Association for the Advancement of Psychology (AAP) and submitted in
1978 to the Federal Trade Commission) with FTC Says Doctors Can Control
Policy of Blue Shield Plans, Wall St. J., Apr. 24, 1981, at 6, col. 1 (noting FTC
decision not to bar doctors from sitting on policymaking boards of Blue Shield
because variety of programs and practices makes generalization about anticompetitive effects difficult).
100. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 462-63 (1941).
101. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213
(1959).
102. The district court in Virginia Academy said, "[p]laintiffs themselves
acknowledge that the best practice for clinical psychologists to follow before
psychotherapy is referral to a physician for a physical examination. This is
unanimously agreed to be necessary so as to rule out a physicial cause of the
nervous or mental problem." 469 F. Supp. 552, 560 (E.D. Va. 1979).
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a violation of the Sherman Act, the Virginia Academy court
may have distorted the anticompetitive impact of the practice.
In the future, courts should more thoroughly analyze the relevant market factors in determining the propriety of adopting
the adjuster analogy. Such an analysis will provide a more solid
basis for deciding whether the questioned activity fits within
the "business of insurance" provision of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.

